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I. Introduction 
This article briefly explores the leading principle in the comparative method of law: 
functionality of comparisons. It will be shown inter alia that functionality serves as a 
common, unifying and mutually intelligible denominator amongst comparative lawyers 
around the world, even though not necessarily in a dogmatic fashion. Furthermore, both the 
rise of the principle and its main criticisms will be noted. The article concludes that 
functionality remains the epicentre of the comparative method of law and that its drawbacks 
remind us that the principle is susceptible to further refinement in the future. 
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II. Definition: Maintaining the Orthodoxy 
The vibrant heart of the comparative method1 in the most dynamic2 branch of law, 
comparative law, dances to the tune of functionality of comparisons. By all means, if there is 
one principle that the method adheres to, it is functionality.3 Normally, functionality is indeed 
referred to as a principle,4 not as a method or a technique. Calling such a principle a ‘method’ 
would present us with a clear paradox, a paradox which is to be avoided at all costs for the 
sake of epistemological clarity: If comparative law primarily encapsulates a method, the 
comparative method of law, then it cannot be superimposed on another method, the 
‘functional method’, for – arguably – such a thing as a sui generis functional method does not 
exist.5 At the very least, we can be certain that a comparative method occurs but it is not at all 
certain whether, in turn, a functional method occurs. Therefore methodologically, and as a 
matter of mere legal pragmatism, a comparative method is used, which guides the subject of 
comparative law under the principle of functionality. Thus, the principle of functionality 
governs the comparative method of law and in turn the comparative method governs what we 
generically call ‘comparative law’. 
With regard to defining functionality, especially as a tertium comparationis,6 all that 
can be said is that as long as in law things fulfil the same function, then they are normally 
comparable.7  
With regard to the choice for the ‘orthodox’ definition of functionality, what can also 
be said is that when a way of business works, we should be sceptical of the introduction of a 
new way of business; even more so when nothing viable is on offer as a new way of business. 
Also, it is to be noted that such a definition is a particularly flexible one, by reason of the fact 
 
1 O Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject (Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford 1965) 4. Also, L 
Constantinesco, Traité de droit comparé, Volume I (L.G.D.J., Paris 1972) 176-205; BS Markesinis, Foreign Law 
and Comparative Methodology: a Subject and a Thesis (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1997) 25; K Zweigert and H 
Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998) 2, 34, 36 and JH 
Merryman, The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer (Kluwer International, the Hague/London/Boston 1999) 
1. Cf. M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 101. 
2 Lord Goff, ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 745, 747-748. See also, more recently, G 
Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences’ in M Van 
Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 
Oregon 2004), 35f and M Andenas and D Fairgrieve, ‘Introduction: Finding a Common Language for Open 
Legal Systems’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law Before the Courts (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2004) xxvii. On the ‘march of comparative law from the 
law libraries into the courts themselves’, as M Freedland points out in the introduction to the last work see H 
Muir Watt, ‘Of Transcultural Borrowing, Hybrids, and the Complexity of Legal Knowledge: An Example of 
Comparative Law Before the French Courts’ and B Rabatel, ‘Liaison Magistrates: Their Role in Comparative 
Law Before International Judicial Cooperation’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds), ibid. 
3 M Kiikeri, Comparative Legal Reasoning and European Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2001) 
28 (quoting K Zweigert, ‘Methodological problems in Comparative Law’, (1972) 7 Israeli Law Review, 465 and 
A Pizzorusso, Corso di diritto Comparato (Giuffrè, Milano 1983) 79). 
4 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34. 
5 Ibid. Cf. R Michaels and M Graziadei’s approach on the matter, who argue in favour of a ‘method’ as opposed 
to the orthodox approach speaking of a principle. See M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand 
and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 100ff and R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in M Reimann 
and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006). 
Note that Michaels admits that the term ‘functional method’ can be a misnomer.  
6 M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 60. 
7 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34. 
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that it is not formalistic or legalistic. In other words, the focus under functionality is not on 
what the formal requirements of the comparable in foreign law are but rather on how foreign 
law operates in the area of law in question.8 In close relation to this, Zweigert and Kötz argue 
that the comparatist may often have to go ‘beyond purely legal devices’ to seek functional 
equivalents.9 Accordingly, we should be scrupulous in our analysis as to why we should 
proceed with the resurrection of other, now largely deceased, approaches. Most certainly, with 
all its drawbacks, all its abstraction and peculiarities, functionality has served comparative 
law circles well, especially when there is no clear alternative in sight. Besides, why should we 
abandon the safest and quickest way to comparative law in the absence of such an alternative? 
Life itself points to functionality; why should we ever have a different approach in the 
comparative method law? Graziadei is illuminating on this: 
We constantly resort to functional comparisons in daily life, to play, to work, to teach 
and learn, and, yes, to communicate with people who share beliefs about the world 
very different from our own.10 
Of course, there are other approaches11 as to how to compare, but these, unlike functionalism, 
do not constitute a concrete methodological pattern in their own right. 
Contextual approaches12 based on localisms here and there are not to be discarded 
altogether in research but they are by reason of their peripheral character in the comparative 
method not the main dish; in effect, they are mere side-orders. Accepting contextual 
approaches to the detriment of functionality in the comparative method would be like 
discarding the constitution of the method, when contextual approaches have only the 
analogical effect of subordinate legislation to the method. Hence, at its heart the comparative 
method hides a unified, overriding and powerful principle, the principle of functionality of 
comparisons. Ultimately, however, the question of accepting other considerations to the 
detriment of functionality in the comparative method is a question of ambition and agenda: 
whose agenda is more undesirably ambitious13? The agenda of functionalist comparatists who 
merely seek similars in the various jurisdictions as a matter of practicality for their thinking 
and working methods;14 or the agenda of ‘comparatists’ who want us to be something of a 
functionalist, a sociologist, a historian, a political scientist and a contextualist at the same 
 
8 Ibid 34-35. 
9 Ibid 35, 38. 
10 M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 113, quoting J Gémar, 
‘Seven Pillars for the Legal Translator: Knowledge, Know-How and Art’ in S Šarčević (ed), Legal Translation: 
Preparation for Accession to the European Union (Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Rijeka 2001) 111 and 
121-125. Cf. M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 173. 
11 Except for functional comparisons, there are also historical comparisons, evolutionary comparisons, structural 
comparisons, thematic comparisons, empirical and statistical comparisons. See VV Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to 
Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2004) 4 Global Jurist Frontiers 2 
<http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?context=gj&article=1126&date=&mt=MTE1OTczNjUxNg%3D
%3D&access_ok_form=Processing...> accessed 1 February 2008. 
12 Referring to one such approach, the historical approach, Graziadei calls it a ‘tradition’. See M Graziadei, ‘The 
Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n 1) 100. 
13 On the question of ambition and unrealistic perfectionism in comparative law, Van Hoecke noted recently: 
‘Strong epistemological pessimism has a perfectionist view on understanding. If you do not fully understand 
something, you do not understand anything. In practice this means that almost nobody can understand almost 
anything. A rather frustrating conclusion, especially for those whose professional life is centred around teaching 
and publishing’. See M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 173. 
14 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34. 
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time?15 Certainly, as the latter ‘comparatist’ is not a comparatist stricto sensu, the preference 
for the former is an obvious one. Again, to avoid misunderstandings, contextualism in 
‘comparative law’ is very welcome16 indeed but the proposition is that this is to occur only 
upon the recognition of the primacy of the principle of functionality in the comparative 
method.17 
Kahn-Freund once said we will teach our students of comparative law to be proud and 
we will teach them to be humble.18 However, if there is a division between functionalists and 
contextualists in the comparative method, even though we are not sure who is the prouder, we 
can without doubt be certain that contextualists are not as humble as functionalists. Their 
excessively ambitious agenda (stretching to almost anything in the theoretical disciplines) 
causes great problems to theoreticians19 as well as practitioners of comparative law, making 
their approach not only unpopular but also weak to the point of obsoleteness. 
Academics such as Palmer are, therefore, correct in maintaining that ‘to move into the 
courtroom and into the halls of the legislature will require methods which are not only 
enlightening, but feasible and non-threatening.’20 Consider, for example, the complications 
that a pro-hermeneutics kind of a comparative method in law might result in. Not only is such 
an approach threatening to the unsuspected judge or practitioner by reason of the pedantic 
nature of such an approach but also to most comparatists or rather to mainstream 
comparatists. In other words, why are we to adopt a pro-hermeneutics approach, when 
practitioners would feel uncomfortable with it, in addition to the academic comparatists who 
already feel uncomfortable with it? 
The main problem which the contextualists have yet to satisfactorily address is not so 
much whether we should seek the ‘contextual whys’ in our method, if at all, but rather why 
and how we should seek these ‘whys’, especially when our primary purpose is comparing 
equivalents per se. Then, it could be maintained that contextualists may argue in a felix qui 
potuit rerum cognoscere causas fashion.21 This may be acceptable but again function can be 
detected without resort to the contextual ‘why’, notwithstanding the fact that the felix qui 
potuit rerum cognoscere causas may be the way for comparatists to shut themselves in the 
proverbial ivory tower; thus, it is not necessarily the primary concern in comparing to detect 
the ‘why’. For example, if we compare cars on the basis of luxury and choose to purchase 
something between a Mercedes-Benz and a BMW of the same engine capacity, we may do so 
without pedantically referring to the history of the two companies; indeed, we may not even 
have to know how long it takes for each car to be produced in the assembly lines, nor why it 
takes so long, nor what it takes for the companies to actually produce a unit of each of the two 
 
15 E.g. P Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 LS 232, at 236 citing J Law, ‘Introduction: Monsters, 
Machines and Sociotechnical Relations in ibid (ed) A Sociology of Monsters[:] Essays on Power, Technology 
and Domination (London 1991) 18. 
16 BS Markesinis (n 1) 26. Also, M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) (n 
1) 101; G Samuel, ‘Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and Social Sciences’ 
in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 39 noting that ‘Concepts and rules need to be contextualised within a range of 
factual situations so that their function can become evident’ and M Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ 
in M Van Hoecke (ed) (n 2) 167. Cf. M Graziadei in the work stated in this note at pp. 110-111. 
17 The question of function precedes that of context. See Rabel’s approach as described in AM Glendon, MW 
Gordon and C Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions (West Publishing, St. Paul, Minn., 1994) 11. 
18 O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 30. 
19 E.g. Rabel’s approach justified in the past that the practical needs override the need of the comparatist to refer 
to philosophy or history. To this effect see B Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Classroom 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, 2004) 13. 
20 VV Palmer (n 11) 3. 
21 Kiikeri states ‘culture’ based considerations are a matter of cognition. See Kiikeri (n 3) 33. 
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models under comparison.22 Why should we know in comparative law the context of law, 
when in life itself context (as opposed to function) hardly comes into play? Alternatively, a 
contextualist might wish us to focus our research on Aristotle’s first lesson, as Markesinis 
calls it: rounded knowledge (in one’s discipline).23 This too seems to be worthy of critical 
scrutiny; this occurs by reason of the fact that even though in theory rounded knowledge and 
in our case a contextualist approach to comparative law is to be sought, in practical terms 
‘Beyond a certain point, narrowing one’s focus is essential in order to sharpen it.’24 
Also, the comparatist who seeks the contextual causes of his comparables may deviate 
from his main task: comparing. Obvious as the point may be, comparing (and contrasting) per 
se is the primary task of the comparatist.25 On the other hand, comparing and contextualising 
is acceptable, as long as the purpose of contextualising in the comparative method is defined. 
The question that such a comparatist has to address is: in addition to comparing functionally 
equivalents, why am I to additionally detect the contextual ‘whys’ behind my comparables? 
More interestingly and in relation to this last point, however, some comparatists argue that the 
contextual ‘whys’ lead us to good comparisons. The problem with this point of view is that 
these comparatists present us with no concrete method. It is not automatic that knowing the 
causes of comparables leads us to good comparisons. Contextualists ask from mainstream 
comparatists to seek ‘contextual whys’ but they fail to tell us, let alone convince us, why we 
should embrace their approach. The same people who ask us to seek the whys in our method, 
fail to concretely tell us why and how we should do so.26 
In short, if the comparatist is to compare, functionalism suffices; if he is to compare 
and in a rather peculiar, if not pedantic fashion, to compare and to discover other things, e.g., 
mentalités in his comparables, he may have to resort to other tools of an extra-legal nature 
(e.g., history, economics, politics). 
A. ‘Incomparables cannot usefully be compared’27 
The comparatist will always be haunted by this memorable and magical expression: 
‘incomparables cannot usefully be compared’. It will puzzle our minds forever, for we are 
seekers of the truth, our truth being good comparisons or, to use professional jargon, 
‘meaningful comparisons’ in the realm of law. Somehow, it could be argued, this expression 
summarises our discipline. However, simple and self-evident as the proposition may seem, we 
cannot always readily detect the comparable. Yet the answer to our question is to concentrate 
on the word ‘usefully’. Other comparatists have described ‘usefully comparable’ as 
sufficiently comparable, reasonably comparable, fruitfully comparable or meaningfully 
comparable.28 In essence, the compromise reached in comparative law is that normally 
comparables have to be governed by a denominator of usefulness. 
For Zweigert and Kötz things that are essentially usefully comparable are ones which 
fulfil the same function.29 Even though this is largely true, at other times we may wish to base 
our analysis on use, a telos, a purpose in the employment of functionality. 
 
22 Cf. Graziadei (n 16) 125. 
23 On this (though in a different context) see BS Markesinis (n 1) 25. 
24 Ibid. 
25 VV Palmer (n 11) 2. 
26 Most certainly, Van Hoecke is correct in arguing that the ‘comparative lawyer is lost’ in this respect. See M 
Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 167. 
27 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34. 
28 E Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2004) 29. 
29 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 34. 
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III. Functionality Is Based on the Essence and the Telos of Comparables 
In my own teaching of comparative law I have often felt that, like Bagehot’s monarch, 
I had a duty to warn and a duty to encourage. To teach students not to be lured by 
homonyms and not to be afraid of synonyms.30 
In principle, comparing one thing to any other thing is possible,31 though in all probability not 
very useful unless, of course, the purpose of such an endeavour is defined from the outset.32 
Academics are somehow divided on the matter. Graziadei, for instance, has criticised as naïve 
the approach that ‘it is possible to compare the incomparable.’33 Örücü, on the other hand, 
successfully argues, however, that ‘Even identicals must be compared in order to determine 
that they are in fact identical.’34 Even so, the fact that something is readily permissible in 
science and more generally in life does not always make it a preferable option. In the 
comparative method this is the approach taken. The method’s comparisons have to be dictated 
by some sort of unifying language of application; by some common denominator. Obviously, 
different objects may have different functions but as Örücü argues ‘all things are comparable 
even if unique.’35 Indeed, there must be an infinite number of comparisons in abstracto in 
life. But as in the real world, what matters in the exciting microcosm of the comparative 
lawyer, is that he reaches comparisons that are not only valid but that they serve some 
purpose. In Academia the name of this purpose is called knowledge,36 or at least the pursuit to 
reach it. In the national legislatures the name of the purpose can be law reform, whereas in 
legal practice such a purpose may be enhanced knowledge of legal solutions in other le
s.  
It is ‘like for like’ (similia similibus) that normally suffices in comparing.37 Howeve
as will be seen below, 
ative method. 
Names in comparisons do not matter a great deal. Homonyms may not always of
‘meaningful’ comparisons. However, the opposite is also true: apparently disconnect
notions, concepts or areas of law may well be relevant to each other as a matter of a
comparison.38 But synonyms are not always to be discarded as a starting point for 
comparison. In this regard, the pairs of comparison Van Hoecke offers in a recent work a
particularly illuminating.39 So, for instance, the terms ‘Interprétation – Interpretation or 
Construction – Auslegung’ respectively in French, English and German are a perfectly valid 
comparative trio (all words basically refer to the same intellectual activity).40 Similarly, t
terms ‘Contrat or Convention – Contract – Vertrag’ refer to the same subject matter (all 
words basically refer to the same reality).41 These are therefore prima facie comparable 
concepts, even though one must state for the sake of balanced argument that the contract laws 
 
30 O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 19. 
31 E Örücü (n 28) 19. 
32 E.g. HE Chodosh, ‘Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 1025, 
1066. 
33 M Graziadei (n 16) 105. 
34 E Örücü (n 28) 19. Emphasis added. 
35 Ibid 
36 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 15. 
37 E Örücü (n 28) 20. 
38 M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16) 175. 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
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comparisons effectively amounts to the confining of tools in the comparative method. That 
of France, Germany and England do not necessarily coincide in remit, appr
with one another.  
A. Comparer des pommes avec des oranges and apples to oranges? 
An idiom which has captivated the English-speaking world as well as significant parts 
French-speaking is the one which asks people not to compare apples and oranges, they being 
different in essence. ‘This response implies, first, that apples and oranges are incomparable, 
and, second, that the incomparability of apples and oranges is itself comparable to the 
incomparability of the two objects in the primary comparison.’42 This problem has been dealt 
with and its proposition of incomparability has been proved to be a false one in the past43 b
arguably, comparing a red apple with an a green apple, when one seeks to distinguish the 
colour quality of redness between the two does not make particular sense; yet if one co
an apple with an orange when one seeks to compare their nutritional qualities, this should 
arguably make good sense. This is very much true, as in the former case, we know a priori that 
by definition a green apple has no qualities of redness; such a comparison is therefore 
obsolete, as it would stress differences only, notwithstanding the fact that it would miss the
point of our comparison: the redness between two normally similar artefacts (similia similibus
doctrine). In the latter case, however, things are considerably more interesting; here, we h
two ‘different’ fruits, both of which, however, are spheroid, tasty, and belong to the same 
scientific kingdom, division and class (plantae, magnoliophyta, magnoliopsida respectivel
Yet, there are differences, and the differences outweigh the similarities between the two: 
apples are normally less bitter than oranges, though oranges can be sweet; apples are norm
never orange and oranges normally never red; so too, apples and oranges do not share the 
same scientific order (rosales and sapindales respectively); hence they cannot be part of the 
same family (rosaceae and rutaceae respectively) and indeed cannot b
malus and citrus respectively). In other, scientific words, they are different species 
(malus domestica and citrus sinensis respectively). Ultimately these are two different artefacts
with different nutrition qualities. Where does all this leave us in law? 
In law things are broadly similar. And even though the author of this article wishe
maintain that it is normally directly similar objects which should be compared, at other times 
the focus need not be on the essence of the things compared so much as on the purpose of 
comparison of two or more ‘different’ artefacts.44 That is not to say that broadly similar 
artefacts cannot and should not be compared; on the contrary, it would seem that in such cases
comparisons are often not only less arduous but also more readily available. Theoretically, 
any law could be compared with any other law, if some common denominator of a
comparison is found; yet the tendency – it would seem – in the comparative method of law i
that we compare ‘corresponding’ areas of law or what is called ‘comparison of equivalents’.45 
On the other hand, it would be an omission not to state that confining purpose
                                                 
42 HE Chodosh (n 32) 1061-1062. 
43 HE Chodosh (n 32) 1061-1063 citing JH Merryman, ‘How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries’ 
eview 1865; also, CA Rogers, ‘Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the (1988) 61 Southern California Law R
Conundrum of Comparative Law’ (1998) 67 George Washington Law Review 149, 150-151, 163. 
44 C Deligianni-Dimitrakou, Eisagogi sto Syncritiko Dikaio (Ekdoseis Sakkoula, Thessaloniki 1997) 24. 
45 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 36. 
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46 D Kokkini-Iatridou, ‘Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law, The Third Part of a (Pre-) 
n. See BS Markesinis (n 1) 25. 
Paradigm’ (1986) Netherlands International Law Review 158ff. Markesinis considers this a question of 
predilectio
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a property law). The legislator made this choice, because it is in 
pursuit of the ‘fresh and flexible’ spirit47 of the French Civil Code as a matter of form,48 so 
to be drafted, even if such an act deals with 
lec he French Civil Code does. Can the legislator do 
f 
Consequently, with regard to the identification of ‘functionality’ there are two variants 
law 
do not share the same function (i.e., they are not functionally equivalent), not only because 
Ruritan ses 
flexible and fresh language, but also (and most importantly) because these statutes belong to 
different substantive areas. Our comparison – technically speaking – is an invalid one. 
de 
e to go to great lengths to imply functionality on the basis of form (as opposed 
to a fun e 
ts 
is a person who engages in comparison for a purpose.’50 It also connects well with the 
approach taken under mainstream functionality, i.e., ‘Functional inquiry also suits the 
                  
B. Comparing areas other than in substantive law (forms, techniques, styles) 
Regardless, we may be tempted to consider the following. Let us argue that the legislator o
Ruritania, for instance, is in pursuit of modernising its intellectual property law as a matter of 
form rather than as a matter of substance. In doing so, it wishes to refer to French law. 
However, in referring to comparative law material, the legislator of Ruritania, a common law 
country for the purposes of our example, wishes to refer to the Civil Code of France (as 
opposed to French intellectu l 
that this is incorporated in the Ruritanian Act 
intel tual property rather than civil law, as t
so? Should it do so? This is open to argument but Örücü offers us the following provoking 
example: 
 
Could we not compare, for example, an English statute on taxation, town and country 
planning or matrimonial causes with three pieces of German legislation on entirely 
different topics if we were trying to establish how such documents are prepared and 
how long or detailed they are in order to develop an understanding of such a source o
law? The examples could be infinite.49 
here: The one variant suggests that Ruritanian intellectual property law and French civil 
ian legislation uses verbose and old-fashioned language, whereas French civil law u
Alternatively, however, we can argue that both the Ruritanian statute on intellectual property 
and the French civil code share the same function as a matter of a law reform exercise, even if 
the fact of the matter remains that the Ruritanian law to be reformed and the French civil co
to be compared with belong to different substantive areas of law. Either way, the result is an 
unsatisfactory one, for in the former case we should not proceed (when we can as a matter of 
form) with our comparison for absence of substantive provisions, whereas in the latter case 
we would hav
ctionality of substance which is the established approach to date). If, however, th
latter approach is followed, then clearly it is all about the purpose of comparisons which 
makes functionality reveal itself. 
The telos therefore is the ultimate judge of comparisons. This notion of telos connec
well with the approach taken under mainstream comparative law, i.e., the comparative lawyer 
                               
g 
 for its clear and 
oidance of cross-references and jargon …its language [is] forceful and thrilling, 
(ed), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
47 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 90, 91, 100 & 145. Zweigert and Kötz praise the Code Civil with the followin
expressions: ‘The Code civil avoids the danger of being too detailed …often been praised
memorable phrases, and for av
free from heavy logic and detailed digression. In France …ordinary citizens may have a feeling of warm 
affection, of closeness to their Code’. 
48 M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 57ff. 
49 E Örücü (n 28) 20. 
50 A Riles, ‘Introduction’ in A Riles 
2001) 11. 
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purposes. In this respect, we must admit that the assumption of the 1900 Paris Congress57 is 
still correct, i.e., it is similar things which are normally to be compared. In fact, in modern 
legal interpretative scholarship the emphasis is on the identification of similarities rather than 
utilitarian approach to comparative law.’51 However, even though telos and utility are not 
quite exactly synonyms, the comparatist is free to define purposes and utility for his me
In this respect, even though functionality is to this day the leading thesis, there is no 
restriction to the comparatist’s research, as long as, of course, his purpose of research52 is 
defined and such purpose bears connection with certain needs, especially practical need
stress is on practicality because ‘In law, ideas and notions that cannot be put to practical use, 
are likely to satisfy only those who spend their time devising them and then quoting each 
other with self-satisfaction.’53 
Functionality in Its Manifestations 
Except for the manifestation of functionality as a tertium comparationis in the comparative 
method of law, functionality, especially in the wider confines of comparative law as a whole, 
can be said to be a polysemantic concept, a concept with many functions.  
Seven distinct functions of functionality are recognised in comparative law.54 Thus, in 
addition to the tertium comparationis function, there are the epistemological function of 
functionality, the presumptive function (as in the praesumptio similitudinis), the formalising 
function in the building of a system, the evaluative function (as a determinant of the ‘better 
law’), the universalising function and, finally, the critical function.  
V. Functionality Serves the Identification of Both Differences and Similaritie
One experiences a singular repugnance to think in terms of difference, to describe 
discrepancies and dispersions.55 
Because we cannot always be sure as to what amounts to a similar or a dissimilar in law, wha
the exact methods to define such terms are and whether the assessment of the similars and 
dissimilars should be done in qualitative or quantitative terms or even in a subjective or an
objective fashion, we must consider that in principle the identification of both differences and
similarities should suffice for a comparative exercise as a whole. Also, it is to be noted
goes without saying that comparative analysis will bring out the differences between actu
solutions.’56 
Yet the comparatist is interested in proceeding with a workable solution for his
discipline – not to enquire in perpetuum into questions of philosophy, at least not for practica
                                                 
51 E Örücü (n 28) 29. 
52 Though on the context of comparing cases, Samuel asks that one’s object of comparison (or what is called 
 37. 
nctional Method of Comparative Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The 
cault as quoted in P Legrand, ‘What “Legal Transplants”?’ in D Nelken, and J Feest (eds), Adapting Legal 
ishing, Oxford 2001) 67. 
herein ‘purpose of comparison’) is defined. See G Samuel in M Van Hoecke (n 2)
53 B Markesinis (n 19) 53. 
54 R Michaels, ‘The Fu
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006).  
55 Fou
Cultures, (Hart Publ
56 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 43. 
57 E Örücü (n 28) 20. 
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 of cross-national research is to reduce unexplained 
variance and find patterns and relationships.’59 Equally, it should be remembered that ‘to 
e 
identifi
as a wh
compar  o do so, we must normally be ‘freed from context’ and ‘the 
 
 
by 
e 
 
 interdependence of national economics (and therefore the 
interde ely 
           
differences between legal systems.58 More interestingly, even international social theory 
stricto sensu suggests that the ‘aim
accept comparability is, however, not the same as accepting similarity: the comparison can of 
course demonstrate great fundamental differences.’60 Without doubt, however, it is th
cation of similarities that is more important to functionality (and hence comparability 
ole). This is true by reason of the fact that we should search for equivalents in the 
ison embarked upon. T
solutions [to the same problem] we find in different jurisdictions must be cut loose from their 
conceptual context and be stripped of their national doctrinal overtones.’61 
The good comparatist will speak of the possible in his method, the better one will 
speak of the desirable in his method. Of course, as already maintained, comparisons can be
infinite.62 It is possible as a matter of theory for one to compare any law to any other law. Is 
this desirable? Arguably, the example of the Ruritanian reformer is another blow to the strict 
application of the principle of functionality. Yet the fact that something is possible should not
always make it a desirable phenomenon. Again, the dichotomy of academic comparatists is a 
matter of agenda: do we want in Academia comparatists who would be practice-oriented 
minds and concentrate on similars in their comparative projects or do we want comparatists 
whose work bears little relevance to practical needs but who are free to compare anything to 
anything even for the sake of identifying differences in the main? The author of this paper 
consciously opts for the former class of comparatists. Practical needs in comparative law 
far override theoretical ones. Surely, this choice does not mean that a comparison of 
differences cannot be pursued, but even this has to bear relevance to practicality. 
Effectively, whether functionality should stress similarities more than differences 
reminds us of Schlesinger’s question between ‘integrative’ and ‘contrastive’ comparative 
law.63 Integrative comparative law stresses the similarities amongst legal systems; contrastiv
comparative law stresses the differences amongst legal systems. Schlesinger has maintained
that whilst the contrastive approach has found its way well into the second half of the 20th 
century, he notes that ‘in the last two or three decades the pendulum has again64 began to 
swing the other way’,65 i.e., the discipline has now reverted back to what is seen as the 1900 
thesis. Schlesinger was convinced that the future of comparative law belonged to the 
integrat 66ive approach.  It must therefore be stressed that the importance of similarities in 
comparative law might be the conscious or even unconscious expression of the idea that the 
world is shrinking; that the
pendence of legal systems) becomes day-by-day more prevalent; and that ultimat
                                      
58 R Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and Communities’ in A Harding 
and E Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International, the Hague 2001) 38. 
59 J Gould and WL Kolb (eds), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Tavistock Publications, London 1964) 116. 
More recently, E Øyen, ‘The Imperfection of Comparisons’ in E Øyen (ed), Comparative Methodology: Theory 
and Practice in International Social Research (Sage, London 1990) 1, 3. 
 Kötz (n 1) 44. 
) 172. 
. 
60 M Bogdan, Comparative Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer 1994) 21. 
61 K Zweigert and H
62 E Örücü (n 28) 19. 
63 RB Schlesinger, ‘The Past and Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43 American Journal of Comparative Law 
479.  
64 Emphasis added. 
65 RB Schlesinger (n 63) 479. See also M Van Hoecke in M Van Hoecke (n 16
66 RB Schlesinger (n 63) 481
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there exists unity of thought (and by extension unity of legal thought) in the human race, as 
over-
yet 
 
e 
 
 
an 
ty 
 
years ago still holds true: 
parative law has to teach is that even within one orbit of 
and 
hich 
Hegelian idealism67 maintained.  
VI. Functionality as a Common Intellectual Denominator of Legal Thought 
We are in the habit of positing a single Form for each plurality of things to which we 
give the same name.68 
In relation to the point raised in the last paragraph, Plato teaches us in his theory of ‘one-
many’, a sub-theory of his theory of the forms, that human thought is unitary in essence; 
the implementation of the Denken might differ in practice. According to this Platonic 
doctrine, when we speak of, for example, horses, we may speak of a black horse, a brown 
horse and a white horse. We may argue that a horse is strong and beautiful and that another 
horse is weak and unattractive. We may perceive different qualities and surrounding notions 
(in our case colours and exoteric qualities of horses) in a different and subjective fashion but
ultimately we speak of essentially the same thing: the species of horses. For Plato the 
manifestations of the different did not matter so much, as he was convinced that a unitary, 
eternal, indivisible and unchangeable essence is found beneath variable qualities of the sam
thing.69 All points to the idea of the one. With regard to law, the theory of ‘one over many’ is
very much relevant to the law convergence thesis, a key area of what we generically call 
‘comparative law’. 
With regard to functionality the thesis here is as follows. Even though functionality in
comparative law does not necessarily pertain to the Platonic belief that there is unity of hum
thought in abstract terms (except perhaps where the praesumptio similitudinis is apparently 
applicable), there is relevance of functionality in modern comparative law with the Platonic 
idea of one-over-many in that both seek similarities in the main. Thus, the scratching for 
useful comparisons should probably pertain to the scratching of similarities in the main, as 
functionality actively looks for unitary elements of thought rather than things that serve 
different purposes. In turn, functionality, so it could be argued, aims at the discovery of uni
of comparable purposes, purposes which otherwise come in agreement with the Platonic 
belief in a favour of a unity of human thought (Platonic One). 
Let us now argue why the above might be true. First of all, Kahn-Freund’s thesis of 40
One of the lessons com
civilization social needs may in one country be served by legal rules and decisions 
in neighbouring country by techniques of what Pound calls ‘social engineering’ w
are quite outside the law.70 
                                                 
67 E.g. RB Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-consciousness (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1989). 
68 Plato, The Republic, 596a. 
69 On this see Plato’s theory of the forms. The characteristics and functions of the forms according to Plato are: i
uncha
) 
ngeable (Phaedo, 78c10-d9), eternal (Phaedo, 79d2), intelligible, not perceptible (Phaedo, 79a1-5), divine 
al (passim), causes of being (‘The one over the many’) (Phaedo, 100c), are (Phaedo, 80a3, b1), incorpore
unqualifiedly what their instances are only with qualification (Phaedo 75b). 
70 O Kahn-Freund (n 1) 22. 
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similar  
an academic subject should be strongly attuned to diversity.  Yet, such a thesis is flawed. 
Reality dictates otherwise.77 One is not sure first of all why functionality should not pursue 
 but most important, whether in finding such 
 
rs to 
 not 
purpos
Second, but in close relation to what Kahn-Freund argued earlier, there is the Zweigert and 
Kötz’s thesis: the praesumptio similitudinis, according to which there is a presumption of 
ity of practical legal results amongst different legal systems.71 Accordingly, the
comparatist normally discovers and realises that methods, techniques and approaches vary in 
domestic laws; practical results are broadly similar.72 Certainly, it must be observed that this 
presumption is not boundless, for such a presumption is not unqualified; as the fathers of the 
concept agree such extensive areas of law as law related to moral values, the law of 
succession or family law are automatically excluded from an endeavour in finding the 
praesumptio.73 Third, in our world of globalisation, it is fair to argue that different legal 
systems bear more resemblances to one another than to their own history.74  
The idea of convergence, especially through the means of functionality, has been 
attacked. Legrand, for instance, has argued that comparative law should not be seduced by the 
idea of uniformity; it should rather support the ‘contrarian challenge’.75 Comparative law as 
76
equivalents and ultimately similars and second
similars why not pursue convergence. 
A poet once argued that ‘a difference …in everything keeps us apart’. This is very 
much true in life and also in law, as for instance American anti-trust laws might be different
and perhaps more effective than anti-trust legislation in another country, only that it would be 
hazardous to claim that because implementation of the same legal purposes differs, therefore 
purposes are different and thus functionality is irrelevant in comparative legal analysis. 
Indeed, the comparative lawyer, though stricken from the range legal, social, cultural, 
economic, religious and political backgrounds in his endeavours to reach valid comparisons, 
has always been reminded that national legal methods might vary but end results or legal 
purposes not necessarily so. ‘Foreign law is not very different from ours but only appea
be so.’78 Also, from a practical point of view, Curran is right to point that a ‘hypersensitivity 
to difference …can become a liability when the comparatist also is a law-maker or is 
preparing to advise law-makers.’79 It is a wholly different matter, a matter which does
touch the core of functionality, whether the effectiveness of different national tactics on the 
e of the same legal results reaches different levels of effectiveness. The fact that 
business laws in system X are more effective and result in a more thriving economy than the 
                                                 
71 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 40. 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid. Also, H Kötz, ‘The Trento Project and its Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law’ in M 
 
w 
nati Workshop on Changing Legal Cultures (Onati Institute, Spain, 1998), pp. 139-149. 
al Practice’ in G Cavinet, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds) (n 2) 
Bussani and U Mattei (eds), The Common Core of European Private Law (Kluwer Law International, the 
Hague/London/New York 2003) 212. Kötz characteristically states that ‘the [praesumptio similitudinis] is a 
rebuttable presumption, and rebutted it must be when there is evidence for doing so.’ For indicative criticisms to
the praesumptio see e.g. A Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (Macmillan, London 1978) 53 and H 
Collins, ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private La
353, 353-365. 
74 L Friedman, ‘Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law’, (1996) 32 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 65; ‘Comments on Applebaum and Nottage’ in J. Feest and V. Gessner (eds.), The 
Proceedings of the 2nd O
75 P Legrand (n 15) 242. 
76 P Legrand, Le Droit compare (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1999) 32-49. 
77 G Alpa, ‘Foreign Law in International Leg
209. 
78 BS Markesinis (n 1) 41. 
79 VG Curran ‚’On the Shoulders of Schlesinger: The Trento Common Core of European Private Law Project’ 
(2002) 2 Global Jurist Frontiers 8 as quoted in E Örücü (n 28) 27. 
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unctionality seems to suggest that its presumptive and 
83
 of 
functionally equivalent laws and the economy of system Z should not negate comparative 
efforts, even though it might be argued (especially from the law reformer’s point of vie
the laws of X are an example to be followed and the laws of Y an example to be avoid
As stated above, we do not have to be comparatists to realise that our world is 
shrinking. In fact, close to Plato’s unity of thought appeal, humanity realises day by day that 
the things which unite us are more than the ones which divide us. ‘The
an” physics or “British” microbiology or “Canadian” geology.’80 The obvious questi
which has to be answered then is if knowledge and science as a whole are unconfused, 
indivisible and inseparable, why should there be separate national laws in non-culturally 
specific areas of law (as opposed to single convergent laws)? It therefore makes little sense in
law to stress differences, when differences are the direct offspring of a nationalist and 
parochial approach to law. Finally, let it also be borne in mind that it is a more demanding 
identify similarities (and hence pursue legal unity) in comparative law research than
is to identify differences, which largely occur by reason of the very division of legal systems.  
VII. The Dysfunctional in Functionality 
Nonetheless, the principle of functionality in the comparative method of law is not exactly 
free from defect. Rather like the high level of abstraction and generalisation in Continental 
legal systems,81 we cannot be absolutely certain how functionality in abstracto can always 
serve practical needs and how this guiding principle can be applied in practice. In fact, there is
no such thing as a concrete guide as to what can actually be compared with what, e.g., in 
judicial matters.82 
Thus, the first major problem with functionality is the fact that it is more of an abstract 
notion than a practical guide on how to compare. Equally, it may be argued that this is the 
case as such a powerful principle has been literally bred and born in law Academia (as 
opposed to legal practice). Yet the inescapable fact is that what may seem theoretically 
obvious may not seem as obvious to practitioners. And even though functionality seems to ac
as a liberating device for the legal scholar, the same notion may initially distance the 
practitioner from comparative law. 
Another critique against f
universalising function may take away from comparative law all that is interesting  about it. 
Frankenberg has once argued that ‘The claim to universality forbids question of the purity
[the comparatist’s] motives, the objectivity of her methods, or the correctness of her 
                                                 
80 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 15. The thesis of the unity of science comes in agreement with the modern 
Vienna Circle of philosophy. For writings on the unity of science see e.g. L von Bertalanffy, ‘An Outline of 
General System Theory’ (1950) 1:2 British Journal or the Philosophy of Science 134, 134-165; P Oppen
and H Putnam, ‘Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’ (1958) 2 Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
heim 
 of 
Science, 3-36 as reprinted in R Boyd, P Gasper and JD Trout, The Philosophy of science, Cambridge (MIT 
Press, Mass./London 1991) 405-427. Cf. J Fodor, ‘Disunity of Science as Working Hypothesis’ (1974) 28 
Synthese 77, reprinted as ‘Special Sciences’ in Boyd and others in the work stated in this note at pp. 429-441 and 
aw of Human Rights: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
S 499. 
more recently, J Fodor, ‘Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years?’ (1997) 11 Philosophical 
Perspectives 149-163. 
81 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 37. 
82 On this see e.g. CH McCrudden, ‘A Common L
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJL
83 AM Glendon, MW Gordon and C Osakwe (n 17) 12. 
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omparatists wish to make 
some allowance for contextual inroads to functionality. In this respect, such critique can be 
, it could perhaps also be argues that his 
against the more traditional Saleilles 1900 thesis (emphasis on the unité 
85
86
 the 
’.  
whether he has spread the net of his researches quite wide enough’88) is free 
from ideology. To this there can be no definitive answer. For one thing, similarities between 
legal results in the various jurisdictions can indeed be detected; for another, the fact that Kötz 
a 
. If this is true, we can in turn rebut the presumption that 
the universalising character of functionality is of an ideological nature (as opposed to an 
epistemological nature).  
A. An expansive principle 
Reaching the last area of critique concerning functionality, all that could be said is that 
functionality’s very strength emanating from its expansive nature in comparative law as a 
whole is its very weakness. Comparative law – it would seem – has a more expansive 
approach when it comes to functionality than any other discipline. Even though its tertium 
comparationis function is understood to be the most central to comparative law, as we know 
it, the other functions with which it comes simply cannot be ignored. In this respect, we must 
acknowledge that functionalism in comparative law is convoluted and that Markesinis’ call is 
still a contemporary one (even though some things in relation to this have improved) – our 
                                                
results.’84 However, this is highly arguable. For one thing, functionality is not necessarily 
abortive of contextual approaches; for another, most mainstream c
questioned. In relation to Frankenberg’s point
approach clearly goes 
des résultats dans la diversité des formes juridiques d’application).  
Recently, it has been argued that functionality may bring about a presumption of a 
common epistemological understanding of what is meant by ‘law’ between legal systems.  
This approach clearly approximates the problem of functionality as a universal apparatus of 
cognition of problems and solutions. The problem is in a sense exacerbated by reason of
fact that there is a multiplicity of legal systems and that for all the ubiquitous character of the 
comparative method, there is no agreement amongst comparatists as to what amounts to ‘law
Also, a last critique towards functionality can be launched against its presumptive 
character (and together with it against its universalising character). Here, the problem is not so 
much whether the praesumptio similitudinis always occurs or not, but rather whether this 
actually represents ‘ideological neutrality’ on the part of the forefathers of such a 
presumption. As for whether the presumption is a rebuttable presumption, Kötz has recently 
made it clear this is ‘a rebuttable presumption, and rebutted it must be when there is evidence 
for doing so.’87 So, for instance, the more culture-specific the area of law, the more onerous it 
is for the comparatist to detect functional equivalence. It is questionable, however, whether 
the strict language used in the definition (‘[the comparatist] should be warned and go back to 
check again whether the terms in which he posed his original question were indeed purely 
functional, and 
has come to slightly water down his earlier, strict approach may lead us to think that the 
presumption is not so much a matter of ideology but rather a common-sense, empirical rule, 
rule that appeals to the legal senses
 
84 G Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law 
Journal 424. More recently, see generally P Zumbansen, ‘Comparative Law’s Coming of Age: Twenty Years 
after Critical Comparisons’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1073-1084. 
85 R Saleilles, ‘Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé’, in Congrès international de droit comparé. 
Procès verbaux I (1905), 167, 173 and 178. 
86 G Samuel in M Van Hoecke (n 2) 61. 
87 H Kötz in M Bussani and U Mattei (n 73) 212. 
88 K Zweigert and H Kötz (n 1) 40. 
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discipline is still in search of an audience,F89F and functionality is worthy of further 
simplification or rather refinement. It is expected that this will breathe new life into the 
theoretical part of the discipline and will further familiarise interested parties (e.g., judges, 
practitioners, reformers) with the practical nature of the subject.  
VIII. Conclusion 
To conclude, even though the leading thesis in the comparative method should be taken to be 
that of ‘functional equivalents’, at other times the comparatist may well benefit from 
specifying the purpose of his comparisons. Functionality, however, is a flexible notion, not an 
arteriosclerotic one. It liberates the comparatist; it does not restrict him. Expansive and 
embracing as the principle is, we cannot disregard the fact that it can pertain to the 
identification of both differences and similarities, yet it would be negligent not to stress that 
functionality reminds us that there ultimately is unity of thought in the human race, that 
despite different approaches of peoples and legal systems, problems, solutions and end results 
are largely similar. For that reason, the universalising character of functionality cannot be 
ignored. To be sure, there are disadvantages, but the advantages by far exceed them. 
Most importantly, in the almost complete absence of a concrete and hence a viable 
alternative to the much-abused notion of functionality in the comparative method of law, the 
comparatist has to learn to live with it. The message is clear: Comparative law’s principal gift 
to 20th century legal science,F90F functionality, has a future, but it must be used with care and 
respect and in a non-dogmatic and contextually inclusive fashion.F91F In using functionality, as 
Zweigert and Kötz have argued most successfully, we are to proceed both with discipline and 
imagination.F92 
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